Stelian Mitu
๐–๐ก๐ฒ ๐ˆ'๐ฆ ๐€๐ฏ๐จ๐ข๐๐ข๐ง๐  ๐ญ๐ก๐ž ๐Œ๐š๐ ๐ง๐ข๐Ÿ๐ข๐œ๐ž๐ง๐ญ ๐’๐ž๐ฏ๐ž๐ง ๐Ÿ“‰ Seven stocks now make up roughly 33% of the entire $SPX500 . That's up from 12.5% in 2016. These are household names: $AAPL (Apple) $NVDA (NVIDIA Corporation) $MSFT (Microsoft) $AMZN (Amazon.com Inc) $TSLA (Tesla Motors, Inc.) $GOOG (Alphabet) $META (Meta Platforms Inc) When a handful of companies carry that much of the index, every pound flowing into a passive fund like $SPY (State Street SPDR S&P 500 ETF) mechanically buys more of them, regardless of whether they're fairly priced. Great on the way up. Less great on the way down. This feels familiar to me, and not in a comforting way. ๐—” ๐—Ÿ๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—ธ ๐—•๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ธ: ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ก๐—ถ๐—ณ๐˜๐˜† ๐—™๐—ถ๐—ณ๐˜๐˜† In the early 1970s, institutional money piled into about fifty blue-chip darlings: $KO (Coca-Cola) $DIS (Walt Disney) $MCD (McDonald's) $XRX (Xerox Corp) Polaroid $IBM (International Business Machines Corporation (IBM)) They were called "one-decision stocks" - buy them, never sell. By 1972, the group traded at an average P/E of 42x, more than double the $SPX500 19x. Then the 1973-74 bear market arrived. $KO fell 69%, $XRX 71%, $MCD 72%, Avon 86%, $DIS 87%, Polaroid 91%. From 1973 to 1977, the Nifty Fifty underperformed with five-year average returns of negative 4.4% annually, compared to the market's positive 2.5%. Many of these companies were genuinely superb businesses. Their earnings kept compounding. The problem wasn't the companies, it was the price people paid for them. Over-valuation hits back eventually. ๐—ช๐—ต๐˜† ๐—œ'๐—บ ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ฎ๐˜†๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—–๐—ฎ๐˜‚๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜€ ๐—ง๐—ผ๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐Ÿงญ A few things keep me up at night on the Mag7 concentration: โ€ข ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐˜€๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ ๐—ฎ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ณ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ. Passive investing has grown from roughly 1% of assets in the early 90s to over 50% today. Market-cap-weighted flows disproportionately reward whatever's already largest. That's a tailwind until it isn't. โ€ข ๐—–๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ธ ๐—ฐ๐˜‚๐˜๐˜€ ๐—ฏ๐—ผ๐˜๐—ต ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐˜†๐˜€. In 2022, when the $SPX500 fell 20.4%, the Magnificent Seven fell about twice as hard, down 41.3%. Drawdowns tend to be nastier at the top of the weight table. โ€ข ๐—š๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜†, ๐—ด๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐˜€๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ธ, ๐˜๐˜„๐—ผ ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ณ๐—ณ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด๐˜€. $NVDA $AAPL $MSFT and the rest are extraordinary businesses. That isn't the question. So were $IBM $XRX back in ages. The question is: what price reflects their realistic future, and what price reflects the story we're telling ourselves? ๐—›๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐—œ'๐—บ ๐—ฃ๐—ผ๐˜€๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐—ฑ Personally, I'm keeping exposure trimmed, favouring businesses where I can defend the valuation with DCF and peer comparisons rather than narrative. Equal-weighted exposure, the "other 493", quality mid-caps, and international markets look more interesting to me on a risk-adjusted basis. Boring, maybe. But boring has its moments. ๐—ฌ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐˜ ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ธ | ๐—–๐—ผ๐—ฝ๐˜† ๐—ง๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐—บ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ป๐˜ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐—ฑ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ | ๐—ฌ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ ๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐˜€๐˜๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐˜€ ๐˜ƒ๐—ฎ๐—น๐˜‚๐—ฒ ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜† ๐—ด๐—ผ ๐˜‚๐—ฝ ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐˜„๐—ป
Not investment advice. The author may have financial interests in the mentioned instruments.
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