Alejandro Jimenez Rico
Nobody seems to know how to properly value a company like $BN.US (Brookfield Corp) - Which is why it remains undervalued and why it remains such a good opportunity for those who do know how to value it. The first mistake with Brookfield is to value it like a normal stock. A simple P/E ratio is not the right lens, because Brookfield is not one business. It is a combination of three engines: an alternative asset manager, a wealth solutions platform built around insurance assets, and a set of operating businesses in infrastructure, renewables, private equity and real estate. That is why the starting point should be distributable earnings, not reported net income. In 2025, Brookfield generated $5.4 billion of distributable earnings before realisations and $6.0 billion of total distributable earnings, while record deployable capital reached $188 billion. Those numbers are much closer to owner earnings than GAAP profit because they strip out some of the mark-to-market noise that can distort how the business is really performing. The cleanest piece is asset management. Fee-bearing capital rose 12% to $603 billion in 2025, and fee-related earnings climbed 22% to $3.0 billion. Brookfield’s own share of distributable earnings from that segment was $1.9 billion, and management says it targets 15%+ annual growth in fee-related earnings and distributable earnings over time. Just as important, Brookfield’s stake in Brookfield Asset Management was worth about $61.5 billion at year-end, net of a non-recourse loan. For investors, that matters because it anchors the valuation with a market-observable asset instead of a story. You are not being asked to believe in a vague conglomerate premium; you can already see one very large and very valuable piece. The second piece is wealth solutions, and this is where many investors stop doing the work. In 2025, Brookfield’s wealth solutions business generated $1.7 billion of distributable earnings, grew insurance assets to $143 billion, and ended the year with $12.7 billion of book equity producing roughly $1.9 billion of annualized cash flows. Brookfield values that equity at about $28 billion. You should not take management’s estimate as gospel, but you also should not dismiss it simply because the structure is more complex than a plain insurer. The real question is whether this platform can keep compounding spread income and insurance float at attractive rates. If the answer is yes, then the market is likely under-appreciating a durable earnings stream simply because it sits inside a complicated wrapper. Then there are the operating businesses, which generated $1.6 billion of distributable earnings in 2025. These are not random leftovers. They include high-quality renewable, infrastructure, private equity and real estate assets, with Brookfield reporting year-end occupancy of 96% in its “super core” real estate portfolio and 95% in its core-plus portfolio. This is also where Brookfield’s capital allocation record matters. In 2025, it completed about $91 billion of monetisations, deployed $126 billion of capital, and repurchased over $1 billion of its own shares. That does not prove the stock is cheap, but it does show Brookfield is not a passive holding company waiting for markets to be kind. It is an active allocator that can sell, recycle, reinvest and repurchase across a very large asset base. This is why the undervaluation argument is ultimately about complexity discount. Investors often prefer simple stories and clean comparables. Brookfield offers neither. But complexity can be a source of mispricing. A good recent example is the Boralex deal announced this week. Brookfield agreed, alongside La Caisse, to acquire Boralex in a transaction implying about C$9.0 billion of enterprise value. Brookfield will own 70%, and the target brings roughly 3,800 MW of wind, solar, hydro and storage assets, with more than 90% contracted for an average of 10 years. That is classic Brookfield: buy a long-duration real-asset platform that public markets may not fully value, use scale and capital to accelerate growth, and compound cash flows over time. So the right way to think about Brookfield is not, “What multiple should I put on this year’s earnings?” It is, “What are these three engines worth separately, and how much discount is the market applying because they sit together?” If you value the asset-management arm as a premium compounding fee business, give the wealth solutions arm a sensible but conservative value, and then assign even a reasonable number to the operating businesses, Brookfield starts to look less like an expensive financial stock and more like a misunderstood collection of cash-flow machines. That is the essence of the undervaluation case. TL;DR - Brookfield may be undervalued because it owns several strong businesses, but the market sees a complex company and prices it too cheaply as a result.
Not investment advice. The author may have financial interests in the mentioned instruments.
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BN.US
Brookfield Corp
45.06
-0.48 (-1.05%)
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