Miguel Maeztu
FICO: the moat with pricing power and its erosion Within the investable universe I monitor, I would argue that FICO has the largest moat that comes to mind. In a nutshell, it provides a credit score to US borrowers and lenders. With decades of credit data, its score becomes incredibly valuable. If someone wants a mortgage or a car loan, besides the thousands of USD its going to spend it banking fees, notary and registration fees, house works... FICO provides a score for a few cents... up to 2018, when it costed like USD 0.6 cents. Now it costs USD 10. In less than 10 years the cost of a FICO score has almost 20x. And it is still used as a key input of credit score, just making a lot more money out of it. It shows, when a company has a product that consumers (lenders and borrowers) need, it can push its price up a lot. Price elasticity is almost zero. The business owner's dream. What happened? FICO has pushed it a bit too far. The regulatory landscape has shifted and now there is a competitor, VantageScore. In 2025, with the FHFA (which oversees Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) approval it ended the decades-long monopoly of FICO. Pushing price has its limitations, even for a business such as FICO. As of today, since many lending models are built around FICO, it sill retains monopoly, both in general and mortgage lending at over 90% rates. But, at a cost 10x lower, VantageScore should be able to take a bit off FICO. Even the largest moats have pricing power limitations. Directly or indirectly. This is really an interesting case and one I look forward to monitoring to see how FICO manages far cheaper competition. A decrease in the price of the FICO score would be a major defeat. The image below depicts the price of a FICO score and its share price. The business is no longer price at sky-high levels of 60-70x EBIT, rather at still premium levels of 25x-30x EBIT. ๐˜‹๐˜ช๐˜ด๐˜ค๐˜ญ๐˜ข๐˜ช๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ: ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ด๐˜ฐ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ฑ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ง ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ข๐˜ถ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฐ๐˜ณ, ๐‘ข๐‘›๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘™๐‘Ž๐‘ก๐‘’๐‘‘ ๐‘ก๐‘œ ๐‘š๐‘ฆ ๐‘’๐‘š๐‘๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ฆ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ต ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ท๐˜ช๐˜ค๐˜ฆ. ๐˜ ๐˜ฎ๐˜ช๐˜จ๐˜ฉ๐˜ต ๐˜ฃ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฐ๐˜ค๐˜ฌ๐˜ด ๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ. ๐˜‹๐˜ฐ ๐˜บ๐˜ฐ๐˜ถ๐˜ณ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ธ๐˜ฏ ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ฆ๐˜ข๐˜ณ๐˜ค๐˜ฉ ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ช๐˜ง ๐˜ถ๐˜ฏ๐˜ด๐˜ถ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ, ๐˜ด๐˜ฆ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฌ ๐˜ฑ๐˜ณ๐˜ฐ๐˜ง๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ด๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ๐˜ข๐˜ญ ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ท๐˜ช๐˜ค๐˜ฆ. ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฑ๐˜บ ๐˜›๐˜ณ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜จ ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ต ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ท๐˜ช๐˜ค๐˜ฆ | ๐˜Š๐˜ข๐˜ฑ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ข๐˜ญ ๐˜ข๐˜ต ๐˜ณ๐˜ช๐˜ด๐˜ฌ | ๐˜—๐˜ข๐˜ด๐˜ต ๐˜ฑ๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ๐˜ง๐˜ฐ๐˜ณ๐˜ฎ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ค๐˜ฆ ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฐ๐˜ฆ๐˜ด ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ต ๐˜จ๐˜ถ๐˜ข๐˜ณ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ต๐˜ฆ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ง๐˜ถ๐˜ต๐˜ถ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ถ๐˜ญ๐˜ต๐˜ด $FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) $SPX500 $JPM (JPMorgan Chase & Co) $C (Citigroup) $WFC (Wells Fargo & Co)
Not investment advice. The author may have financial interests in the mentioned instruments.
null
.