Miguel Maeztu
๐…๐จ๐จ๐ ๐๐ž๐ฅ๐ข๐ฏ๐ž๐ซ๐ฒ, ๐ฆ๐š๐ซ๐ค๐ž๐ญ ๐ž๐ฏ๐จ๐ฅ๐ฎ๐ญ๐ข๐จ๐ง ๐š๐ง๐ ๐ฉ๐ซ๐จ๐ฌ๐ฉ๐ž๐œ๐ญ๐ฌ I was reading about the Food Delivery industry over the week-end, partly because it lives for free in my mind since it is at the core of Alibaba's strategy (or fight) at the moment. I was trying to develop the mental model of what that looks like in 10 years. Let's also assume that Food Delivery also means short term delivery (30min-1hr) of anything, from food to groceries to any other goods. Arguably, its all about scale: that is my conclusion. To reverse engineer that, there are 4 parties: - The platform (Uber Eats, iFood, Meituan, Ele.me, DoorDash, you name it). That is a tech platform, largely a fixed cost but with ongoing R&D expenses to improve it as it needs to read data better over time. - The consumer: you or me when we order food online. The more of us in a platform the better, as the merchants get to sell more. - The merchant/shop: it is listed on the platform, the more of them you have, the better the offer, the more choices to the consumer. - The rider/deliverer: today its someone on a bike/car/motorbike, tomorrow likely a drone/robot (cheaper, no pension contributions, doesn't strike and doesn't change jobs). The platform keeps a cut (the take rate), the consumer needs the best offering, best price and fastest delivery, the merchant keeps a cut from the product it sells and needs lots of consumers but also drivers put by the platform in a timely manner to pick-up that food and get it to the consumer. The driver/rider takes a cut from the price of the delivery which is the salary in the end. Now, this clearly creates a feedback loop. The more merchants, the more consumers because there is more and better choice, the more riders because there are more orders. The platform keeps a % take rate of all that. Naturally, the more scale, the more profits. It seems natural that this will end up in a very concentrated industry likely by geography. I doubt there can be more than 2 players per market in the long-term at the risk of operating a loss-making or not very profitable platform. At scale, it is a lucrative market. Therefore, I can see why companies are fighting so much to be the winner in the space. My portfolio exposure to instant / food delivery is meaningful via Prosus and Alibaba (data is approximate but provides an overall picture of this oligopoly or almost monopolistic industry): - China: Alibaba owns about 30% of the market, Meituan 60/70 with JD breaking in. - India: Prosus owns ca. 20-25% of Swiggy, second player in the market with 45% of the market share - France: Uber Eats (45%), Deliveroo (DoorDash) 30%isg, Just Eat (15-20%) owned by Prosus - Germany: Just Eat Takeaway owned by Prosus has a 70% market share, DoorDash then 15% (both via their local companies). -UK: Uber has nearly 45-50%, Just Eat (Prosus) 25-30%, DoorDash 20-25%. - US: DoorDash over 60%, Uber the rest - Canada: split between DoorDash, Uber and Just Eat - Brazil: iFood (with Prosus behind) has around 80-90%. - Mexico: Didi 30-40%. This should lead to local buys of rivals and exits over time to focus on the most profitable markets, which would lead to concentration in a monopolistic or duopolistic market. ๐˜‹๐˜ช๐˜ด๐˜ค๐˜ญ๐˜ข๐˜ช๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ: ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ด๐˜ฐ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ฑ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ง ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ข๐˜ถ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฐ๐˜ณ, ๐‘ข๐‘›๐‘Ÿ๐‘’๐‘™๐‘Ž๐‘ก๐‘’๐‘‘ ๐‘ก๐‘œ ๐‘š๐‘ฆ ๐‘’๐‘š๐‘๐‘™๐‘œ๐‘ฆ๐‘’๐‘Ÿ ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ต ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ท๐˜ช๐˜ค๐˜ฆ. ๐˜ ๐˜ฎ๐˜ช๐˜จ๐˜ฉ๐˜ต ๐˜ฃ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฐ๐˜ค๐˜ฌ๐˜ด ๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ. ๐˜‹๐˜ฐ ๐˜บ๐˜ฐ๐˜ถ๐˜ณ ๐˜ฐ๐˜ธ๐˜ฏ ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ฆ๐˜ข๐˜ณ๐˜ค๐˜ฉ ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ช๐˜ง ๐˜ถ๐˜ฏ๐˜ด๐˜ถ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ, ๐˜ด๐˜ฆ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฌ ๐˜ฑ๐˜ณ๐˜ฐ๐˜ง๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ด๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ๐˜ข๐˜ญ ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ท๐˜ช๐˜ค๐˜ฆ. ๐˜Š๐˜ฐ๐˜ฑ๐˜บ ๐˜›๐˜ณ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜จ ๐˜ช๐˜ด ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ต ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ต๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ท๐˜ช๐˜ค๐˜ฆ | ๐˜Š๐˜ข๐˜ฑ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ข๐˜ญ ๐˜ข๐˜ต ๐˜ณ๐˜ช๐˜ด๐˜ฌ | ๐˜—๐˜ข๐˜ด๐˜ต ๐˜ฑ๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ๐˜ง๐˜ฐ๐˜ณ๐˜ฎ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ค๐˜ฆ ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฐ๐˜ฆ๐˜ด ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฐ๐˜ต ๐˜จ๐˜ถ๐˜ข๐˜ณ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ต๐˜ฆ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ง๐˜ถ๐˜ต๐˜ถ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ด๐˜ถ๐˜ญ๐˜ต๐˜ด $UBER (Uber Technologies Inc.) $DASH.US (DoorDash Inc) $BABA (Alibaba-ADR) $PRX.NV (Prosus NV) $03690.HK (Meituan Class B) $JD.US (JD.com-ADR)
Not investment advice. The author may have financial interests in the mentioned instruments.
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